Ira Sachs v. Joseph S. Lesser, Loeb Investors Co. XL, and United Park City Mines Company, Capital Growth Partners, and John Does 1-10 : Brief of Appellee by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2007
Ira Sachs v. Joseph S. Lesser, Loeb Investors Co. XL,
and United Park City Mines Company, Capital
Growth Partners, and John Does 1-10 : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Anthony C. Kaye; Jason D. Boren; Laura S. Scott; Shane D. Hillman; Attorneys for Appellants.
Kathryn Collard; Attorney for Appellee .
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Sachs v. Lesser, No. 20070472.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2704
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
IRA SACHS, 
Plaintiff & Appellee, 
v. 
JOSEPH S. LESSER, LOEB INVESTORS 
CO. XL, AND UNITED PARK CITY 
MINES COMPANY, CAPITAL GROWTH 
PARTNERS, AND JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Defendants & Appellants 
Case No. 20070472-SC 
20060257-CA 
040926707 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Anthony C. Kaye 
Jason D. Boren 
Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, 
LLP 
201 South Main Street, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2221 
Attorneys for Defendants -Appellants 
Joseph S. Lesser and 
Loeb Investors Co. XL 
Kathryn Collard (#0697) 
The Law Firm of Kathryn Collard, LC 
4265 South 1400 East, Suite A 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124-2543 
Telephone: (801) 277-2277 
Facsimile: (801) 277-2557 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 
Ira Sachs 
Laura S. Scott 
Shane D. Hillman 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
Attorneys for Defendant -Appellant 
United Park City Mines Company 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
. ,w, -12007 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
IRA SACHS, 
Plaintiff & Appellee, 
v. 
JOSEPH S. LESSER, LOEB INVESTORS 
CO. XL, AND UNITED PARK CITY 
MINES COMPANY, CAPITAL GROWTH 
PARTNERS, AND JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Defendants & Appellants 
Case No. 20070472-SC 
20060257-CA 
040926707 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Anthony C. Kaye 
Jason D. Boren 
Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, 
LLP 
201 South Main Street, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2221 
Attorneys for Defendants -Appellants 
Joseph S. Lesser and 
Loeb Investors Co. XL 
Kathryn Collard (#0697) 
The Law Firm of Kathryn Collard, LC 
4265 South 1400 East, Suite A 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124-2543 
Telephone: (801) 277-2277 
Facsimile: (801) 277-2557 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 
Ira Sachs 
Laura S. Scott 
Shane D. Hillman 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
Attorneys for Defendant -Appellant 
United Park City Mines Company 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES v 
STATEMENT OF PARTIES 1 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
I Nature of the Case 2 
II Course of Proceedings and Disposition In The Lower Courts 4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES ON WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI 5 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 13 
I Sachs' Agreement To Find A Buyer For The Stock Of UPCM For A 
Fee Is Not A "Real Estate" Transaction under UREBA. Thus, UREBA 
Does Not Bar Sachs' Claims For Breach of Implied Contract Because 
Sachs Was Not Licensed As A Real Estate Broker Under UREBA 13 
H Sachs' Agreement To Find A Buyer For The Stock Of A 
Corporation For A Fee Is Not An "Agreement Involving The Sale 
Or Purchase Of Real Estate" Under §25-5-4 of the Utah Statute Of 
Frauds. Thus, the Statute Does Not Bar Plaintiff Sachs' Claims For 
Breach of Implied Contract 14 
ARGUMENT 15 
POINT I UREBA DOES NOT BAR PLAINTIFF SACHS' CLAIMS FOR 
BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT BECAUSE UREBA DOES 
NOT REQUIRE A REAL ESTATE BROKER LICENSE TO 
ENGAGE IN TRANSACTIONS DEALING EXCLUSIVELY IN 
CORPORATE STOCK 15 
A. An Agreement To Find A Buyer For A Corporation's Stock In 
Exchange For A Fee Is Not Regulated Under UREBA 15 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS cont'd. 
The Phrase "Business Opportunity Involving Real Property" 
Is Ambiguous 17 
Defendants' Interpretation Of The Phrase "Business 
Opportunities Involving Real Property" Renders the Word 
"Opportunities" Meaningless In Violation of Basic Rules of 
Statutory Construction 19 
The Ordinary Meaning of "Business Opportunities Involving 
Real Property" Does Not Include The Sale of Corporate Stock 
Where the Corporation Retains Its Real Estate Assets In The 
Transaction 19 
The Phrase "Business Opportunities Involving Real Property" 
Should Not Be Interpreted According To The Prior Deleted 
Statutory Definition of "Business Opportunity" 22 
1. The Prior Deleted Statutory Definition Of "Business 
Opportunity" Is Ambiguous And Would Not Resolve 
The Issue Of Statutory Interpretation Presented In This 
Case Even If Adopted 22 
2. The Court of Appeals Was Not Required To Apply The 
Prior Statutory Definition Of "Business Opportunity" 
Deleted By The Legislature 24 
3. Defendants' Claim That The Court of Appeals Relied 
On Incomplete Legislative History Was Not Presented 
In The Lower Courts. Thus, The Court Should Decline 
To Consider This Claim 27 
4. The 1985 Amendments To UREBA Deleting The 
Definition Of "Business Opportunity" and Adding The 
Words "Involving Real Property" To Qualify The Term 
"Business Opportunities" In The Definition Of "Real 
Estate" In §61-2-2(14) Are Substantive 28 
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS cont'd. 
F. Defendants' Claim That The Judiciary Should Defer To The 
Real Estate Commission's Definition of "Business 
Opportunities" Was Not Presented In The Lower Courts And 
This Court Should Decline To Consider It. Alternatively, The 
Claim Is Inapplicable Under The Facts Of This Case 31 
G. Other States' Interpretations Of Their Real Estate Broker 
Acts Are Not Conclusive On The Interpretation Of UREBA 
Under Utah Law 34 
H. The Court of Appeals Correctly Declined To Interpret 
UREBA As Encompassing Transactions Involving 
Exclusively The Sale Of Corporate Stock Where The 
Legislature Has Not Declared Its Intention To Do So 37 
I. The Court Of Appeals Correctly Held That "Real Estate" In 
UREBA Does Not Encompass The Sale Of A Corporation's 
Stock Based On The Long Recognized Distinction Under Utah 
Law Between Stock Sales And Real Property Asset Sales 38 
J. The Court Of Appeals' Interpretation Of UREBA Is 
Consistent With Constitutional And Statutory Requirements 
Of Due Process And Equal Protection 41 
K. The Court of Appeals' Interpretation of UREBA Is Consistent 
With The Purposes and Policies of the Statute And Does Not 
Elevate Form Over Substance 45 
L. The Court of Appeals' Interpretation Of UREBA Is Consistent 
With the Purposes Of UREBA And Does Not Invite Abuse 45 
POINT II THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD 
THAT THE UTAH STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT 
APPLY TO AN AGREEMENT TO FIND A BUYER FOR 
THE STOCK OF A CORPORATION IN EXCHANGE FOR 
A FEE 48 
A. The Plain Words Of The Utah Statute Of Frauds Do Not 
Require That An Agreement To Find A Buyer For The Stock 
Of A Corporation Must Be In Writing To Be Enforceable 48 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS cont'd. 
CONCLUSION 50 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 51 
ADDENDUM OF APPELLEE (See separate volume) 
iv 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Bertha v. Remy International, Inc., 414 F.Supp.2d 869 (Wis. 2006) 26 
Cooney v. Ritter, 939 F.2d 81 (3rd Cir. 1991) 36 
Gruberv. Owens-Illinois Inc., 899 F.2d 1366 (3rd Cir. 1990) 36 
Shochet Securities v. First Union Corporation, 
663 F. Supp. 1035 (U.S.D.C. Fla. 1987) 35,43,44 
STATE CASES 
American Rural Cellular v. Systems Comm., 890 P.2d 1035 (Utah App. 1995) 46 
Andersen v. Johnson, 160P.2d725 (Utah 1945) 27 
Aris Vision Institute, Inc. v. Wasatch Property Management, Inc., 2006 UT 45, 
143P.3d278 42 
Biddle v. Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 110 993 P.2d 875 24 
Bluffdale Mountain Homes, LCv. Bluffdale City, 2007 UT 57, P.3d 1016 18 
Bourgeous v. State, 2002 UT App 5, 41 P.3d 461 24 
Broughallv. Black Forest Dev. Co., 593 P.2d 314 (Colo. 1978) 35 
Carter v. University of Utah Med. Or., 2006 UT78 19 
Chase v. Morgan, 339 P.2d 1019 (1951) 27 
Decius v. Action Collection Serv., 2004 UT App 484, 105 P.3d 956 26 
Diversified General Corp. v. White Barn Golf Course, 
584 P.2d 848 (Utah 1978) 15,16 
Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. ofEduc, 797 P.2d 412 (Utah 1990) 20,22,28,31,40,41 
Everett v. Goodloe, 602 S.E.2d284 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) 36 
Global Recreation, Inc. v. Cedar Hills Dev. Co., 614P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1980) 46 
Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838 (Utah 1990) 44 
v 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES cont'd. 
I.M.L. v. State of Utah, 2002 UT 110 27,42 
Ivers v. Utah Department of Transportation, 2007 UT 19, 154 P.3d 802 1 
Li v. Zhang, 2005 UT App 246, 120 P.3d 30, aff d by Li v. 
Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Utah, 2006 UT 80, 150 P.3d 471 18 
Lieffv. Medco Prof'l Servs. Corp., 973 P.2d 1276 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998) 35 
Mackintosh v. Hampshire, 832 P.2d 1298 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 49 
Madsen v. Borthrick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988) 28,29 
Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus / Church of Jesus Christ ofLatter-
DaySaints,2007XJT42, 164P.3d384 1,33 
McRae v. Jackson, 526 P.2d 1190 (Utah 1974) 38 
Morton Int'I, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991) 32,33 
Orlob v. Wasatch Medical Management, 2005 UT App 430, 124 P.2d 269 2 
Sachs v. Lesser, 2007 UT 169 5,16-19,21,22,24-27,29-31,34-40, 42,45-50 
Schmittv. Coad, 604 P.2d 507, 509 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) 35 
Sillv. Hart,2001UT45, 162 P.3d 1099 21,30 
Shibata v. Bear River State Bank, 115 Utah 395, 205 P.2d 251 (Utah 1949) 42 
Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, 44 P.3d 742 2 
Spring v. Rosauer, 641P.2d 1216 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) 35 
State v. Amador, 804 P.2d 1233 (Utah App. 1990) 28 
State v. Gallegos, 2007 UT 81 43 
State v. Garcia, 2007 UT App 228, 164 P.3d 1264 28 
State v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 94 P.2d 414 (Utah 1939) 44 
State v. Mooney, 2004 UT 49, 98 P.3d 420 42,43 
vi 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES cont'd. 
State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998) 27 
State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599 (Utah App. 1992) 28 
Tindley v. Salt Lake City School Dist, 2005 UT 30, 116 P.3d 295 20,22,28,31,40,41 
Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, 
Inc., 789 P.2d 24 (Utah 1990) 26 
Utah Public Employees Ass'n v. State, 2006 UT 9, 131 P.3d208 18,30 
Utah State Tax Comm 'n v. Stevenson, 2006 UT 84, 150 P.3d 521 21 
Visitor Information Center Authority of Grand County v. Customer 
Service Div., Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 930 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1997) 29 
Williams v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 754P.2d41 (Utah 1988) 33 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article VI, §22 44 
UTAH STATUTES 
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., §12-61-101(2)(i) 35 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), §16-10a-102(33) 21 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), §25-5-4 2,14,48,49 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), §25-5-4(l)(e) 14,48 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), §61-2-1, et. seq. (UREBA) 1,2 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), §61-2-2(14) 1,13,16,17,19-21,24,25,28-32,36-39,42,48 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), §61-2-5.5(l)(a) 32 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), §68-3-12(2)(k) 19,20 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), §68-3-12(2)(p) 21 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), §68-3-4 42 
vii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES cont'd. 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), §68-3-5 24 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), §70A-8-l 12 14,49 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), §76-1-104 43 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), §76-1-104(2) 43 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), §76-1-106 42 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), §76-2-101(l)(a) 41 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), §78-2-2(3)(a) 1 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah R.Civ.P. 56 2 
Utah Admin. Code, r. 162-1-2.1.2 33 
Utah Admin. Code,r. 162-1 through r. 162-109 33 
OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITIES 
Informal Opinion No. 78-233, 1978 WL 257892 (Utah A.G.) 23 
H.B. 102, Utah 1996 Session Laws, "Division of Real Estate-
General Amendments" 44 
H.B. No. 284, Laws of Utah 1985, Chapter 162 "Real Estate Amendments" 44 
S.B. 172, Utah 2005 Session Laws, Chapter 199, "Division of 
Real Estate Amendments" 44 
S.B. 198, Utah 2003 Session Laws, "Division of Real Estate-
Definitions Amendment 44 
TREATISES 
1A Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §22.30 
(Sands 4th rev. ed. 1985) 29 
viii 
STATEMENT OF PARTIES 
The parties are listed in the caption. In this brief, Plaintiff-Appellee Ira Sachs is 
referred to as "Plaintiff Sachs." Defendants-Appellants Joseph S. Lesser and Loeb 
Investors, Inc. are referred to as "Lesser" and "Loeb", and in some citations collectively 
as "L&L". Defendant-Appellant United Park City Mines Company and former defendant 
Capital Growth Partners, Inc., are referred to as "UPCM" and "Capital." Defendants' 
opening brief is referred to as "Def. Br." All statutory references are to Utah Code Ann. 
(1953), as amended, unless otherwise indicated. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in holding that the Utah Real Estate 
Brokers Act ("UREBA"), §§61-2-1, et. seq., does not bar Plaintiff Sachs' claims for 
breach of implied contract because an agreement to find a buyer for the stock of a 
corporation in exchange for a fee, involves only personal property, and is thus not "a 
business opportunity involving real property" within the definition of a "real estate" 
under §61-2-2(14) of UREBA? 
Standard of Review: On certiorari, the Court reviews the decision of the court of 
appeals and not that of the trial court. Ivers v. Utah Department of Transportation, 2007 
UT 19, f7, 154 P.3d 802. The Utah Supreme Court reviews Court of Appeals' 
interpretation of a statute for correctness. Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus / Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2007 UT 42, f!6, 164 P.3d 384. 
1 
2. Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in holding that §25-5-4 of the Utah 
statute of frauds does not bar Plaintiff Sachs' claims for breach of implied contract 
because an oral agreement to find a buyer for the stock of a corporation in exchange for a 
fee, involves only personal property, and is thus not an agreement to sell real property 
under §25-5-4 of the Utah statute of frauds? 
Standard of Review: Application of the statute of frauds is a question of law that 
is reviewed for correctness. Orlob v. Wasatch Medical Management, 2005 UT App 430, 
1J22, 124 P.2d 269, citing Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, Tf23, 44 P.3d 742. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
AND RULES 
1. The Utah Real Estate Brokers Act ("UREBA"), §61-2-1 el seq., (2005), 
Addendum 2 
2. Provisions of current and prior versions of UREBA containing definitions 
of "business opportunity" and "real estate" in UREBA, Addendum 3 
3. Utah statute of frauds, §25-5-4 (2004), Addendum 4 
4. Utah R.Civ.P. 56, Addendum 5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I Nature of the Case 
This is an action for breach of implied contract to enforce a finder's fee agreement 
that arose when Lesser, as Chairman of the Board of UPCM and President of Loeb, the 
majority stockholder group of UPCM, requested Plaintiff Sachs, a business consultant in 
Park City, Utah, to find a buyer for UPCM, a publicly traded corporation on the New 
2 
York Stock Exchange, after receiving written notice of the fee Plaintiff Sachs expected 
for his services. Plaintiff Sachs was not licensed as a real estate broker at the time. 
Plaintiff Sachs did not offer or agree to find a buyer for UPCM's business, or any of its 
real property assets, but only to find a buyer for the corporation in response to Lesser's 
request. 
Subsequently, Plaintiff Sachs located one Gerald Jackson ("Jackson") to purchase 
UPCM. After speaking with Sachs, Jackson formed a company, Capital, that 
subsequently acquired UPCM by purchasing 100% of UPCM's outstanding common 
stock in a complex merger transaction in which UPCM, Lesser and Loeb were 
represented by numerous attorneys and an investment banking firm. In the merger, 
UPCM was the surviving corporation and retained all of its assets, including its real 
property assets. Sachs played no part in the merger transaction. 
Following the merger, Lesser and UPCM's President, Hank Rothwell, refused to 
pay Sachs' finder's fee based on a ruse that Jackson was already in a deal with Rothwell 
to purchase UPCM at the time Sachs contacted Jackson to buy UPCM. After making 
extensive, but ultimately unsuccessful, attempts to negotiate the payment of the finder's 
fee, Plaintiff Sachs brought this action, asserting claims against Lesser, Loeb, UPCM and 
Capital, for breach of contract implied in fact or law and other claims not relevant to this 
appeal. 
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II Course of Proceedings and Disposition In The Lower Courts 
Plaintiff Sachs filed his Complaint on January 21, 2004. (R.l-24) On February 23, 
2004, Lesser and Loeb moved to dismiss the Complaint on the ground that the subject 
finder's fee agreement was barred by the New York Statute of Frauds. (R. 51-53) UPCM 
and Capital joined the motion. (R. 54-57) On September 27, 2004, Judge Bruce C. 
Lubeck heard oral argument on the motion to dismiss (R. 156) and on September 29, 
2004, issued a Ruling and Order denying the motion to dismiss. (R. 157-192) 
On October 13, 2004, UPCM and Capital filed their Answer (R. 193-206) and on 
October 15, 2004, Lesser and Loeb filed their Answer. (R. 207-218) 
On January 20, 2005, Capital filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground 
that Capital was not a party to the finder's fee agreement and or otherwise not liable for 
its alleged breach as a successor to UPCM. (R. 525-568) 
On February 5, 2005, Plaintiff Sachs filed a Verification of his Complaint. 
(R. 666-668) 
On March 31, 2005, Lesser and Loeb filed a motion for summary judgment. (R. 
1082-1084) On April 8, 2005, UPCM filed a motion for summary judgment. (R. 1206-
1208) 
On September 13, 2005, the district court granted Capital's motion for summary 
judgment, which Plaintiff Sachs does not appeal. (R. 2191-2190) On December 12, 2005, 
the district court heard oral argument on the motions for summary judgment of Lesser, 
Loeb and UPCM. (R. 2205) On February 15, 2006, the district court entered an Order 
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granting the Defendants' motions and dismissing Plaintiffs1 claims in this action (Final 
Judgment). (R. 2213-2222) 
On March 16, 2006, Plaintiff Sachs filed his Notice of Appeal. (R. 2224-2225) 
This Court transferred the appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals on March 23, 2006. (R. 
2228) The Utah Court of Appeals heard oral argument on March 26, 2007. 
On May 17, 2007, the Utah Court of Appeals issued an Opinion affirming in part 
and reversing and remanding in part the decision of the district court. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling dismissing Sachs' express contract claim, and 
reversed the district court's decision granting summary judgment and dismissing Sachs' 
implied contract claims based on the presence of a disputed issue of fact as to whether 
Plaintiff Sachs procured Jackson as the buyer for UPCM. Finally, the Court of Appeals 
reversed the district court's decisions that UREBA and the Utah statute of frauds bar 
Plaintiff Sachs' claims and remanded the case to the district court for trial on the merits. 
Sachs v. Lesser, 2007 UT 169 ("Sachs"), attached as Addendum 1. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
The facts relevant to the legal issues on which certiorari was granted are as 
follows:1 
1. Plaintiff Ira Sachs is a long time resident of Park City, Utah, and a 
shareholder in UPCM at all relevant times. For many years, Mr. Sachs has worked as a 
business consultant in Park City. See, "Plaintiffs Statement of Facts", Plaintiffs Mem. 
1
 Plaintiff Sachs' full Statement of Facts presented to the Court of Appeals is set forth 
in the "Brief of Appellant", at 5-22. 
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Op. Lesser and Loeb Motion For Summary Judgment, ("Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L"), 111-3, 
R.1321; "Statement of Facts", Plaintiffs Mem. Op. UPCM Motion For Summary 
Judgment, ("Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM"), f 1-3, R. 1624-1625; Verified Complaint, f 1, 18-
19, R. 2,4-5; Sachs Dep., R. 1357, 1361-1362, at 20:8-24:16; Sachs Affidavit, 1f5-6, 
R.1442; Sachs UPCM stock certificate, R.1482-1483. 
2. Defendant Lesser was the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the 
UPCM, and the President of Loeb, the controlling shareholder group of UCPM, and 
conducted business of UCPM and Loeb within the State of Utah, at all relevant times. 
See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, ffl[4-5, R. 1321-1322; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, ffl[ 4-5, R. 1625; 
Verified Complaint, ffif3,13, R- 2; Answer of Lesser and Loeb, \2, R. 208 (partially 
admitting allegations); Lesser Dep. R. 1399, 1402 at 18:17-21:24. 
3. UPCM was a publicly traded New York Stock Exchange company, and 
maintained its principal place of business, operations and stockholder meetings, within 
the State of Utah at all relevant times. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, \6, R. 1322; Pltf. Mem. 
Op. UPCM, \6, R. 1625; Verified Complaint, 1J4, R-2; Sachs Affidavit, ffl[7, 9, R.1442-
1443; Lesser Dep. R. 1397, 1402 at 21:2-24. 
4. The principal business of UPCM was the leasing, development and sale of 
its real property in Utah. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, \1, R.1322; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, 
Jl, R. 1625; Verified Complaint, ffi[10-l 1, R. 3-4. 
5. Hank Rothwell, the President of the UPCM, ("Rothwell"), conducted the 
business of UPCM at its principal offices in Park City, Utah, at all relevant times. See, 
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Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, f 8, R. 1322; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, f 8, R. 1625; Verified 
Complaint, [^12, R. 4; Rothwell Dep. R. 1391, 1394, at 140:1-4. 
6. In addition to serving as officers of UPCM, Lesser and Rothwell were 
experienced and licensed real estate brokers and investors at all relevant times. See, Pltf. 
Mem. Op. L&L, ffi[64-65, R. 1331; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, ffl64-65, R. 1634; Lesser 
Real Estate License Record, R.1479; Lesser Dep. R. 1399, 1400-1402, at 13:15-24; 
14:11-16; 16:13-17:18; 18:17-20:9; Rothwell Real Estate License Verification, R. 1480-
1481; Rothwell Dep. R. 1391, 1392, at 10:16-12:25; 1398, at 199:23-25. 
7. At the time of the events referred herein, Plaintiff Sachs had known 
Rothwell for 15 to 20 years. Rothwell knew Sachs was a deal maker and business 
consultant who worked on a fee basis. Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, *[f9, R.1322; Pltf. Mem. Op. 
UPCM, Tf9, R. 1626; Sachs Dep., R. 1357, 1365, at 51:1-6. 
8. In early 2001, Plaintiff Sachs learned of the failure of a joint venture 
between UPCM and DMB and introduced one of his clients, Granite Land Company, to 
Rothwell as a potential joint venturer for UPCM by March 2001. Granite signed a 
confidentiality agreement with UPCM and subsequently engaged in negotiations 
regarding a possible joint venture or purchase of UPCM. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, 1fl[l 1-
13, R. 1323; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, fflfl 1-13, R. 1626; Verified Complaint, 1ffl20-22, R. 
5, Sachs Dep. 1357, 1363-1366, at 42:16-51:23; 62:1-13; Rothwell Dep. R. 1709, 1719, 
at 139:22-140:19. 
9. On or about May 2, 2001, Plaintiff Sachs met with Lesser and a mutual 
friend at Lesser's private club in New York City. During the meeting, Lesser expressed 
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his strong displeasure regarding Rothwell's handling of the failed UPCM joint venture 
with DMB, stating that, "I do not think Hank Rothwell is capable of running a New York 
Stock Exchange company." Lesser also told Sachs that he and Loeb had lost faith in 
Rothwell and did not want to invest any more money in UPCM. Lesser requested Sachs 
help him locate a joint venturer or purchaser for UPCM as quickly as possible, 
importuning Sachs to "get the job done, whether it's with Granite, or someone else, or a 
combination." See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, ffi[14-15, R- 1323; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, ffifl4-
15, R. 1626-1627; Verified Complaint, ffi[23-26, R. 5-6; Sachs Dep. R. 1357, 1367-1369, 
at 67:12-69:12; 73:23-81:15; Lesser Dep.R. 1399, 1405, at 47:18- 48:5; Jackson Dep. R. 
1454, R. 1459, at 22:11-18. 
10. Although the specific amount of the finder's fee was not discussed at their 
May 2, 2001 meeting, both Lesser and Sachs understood that Plaintiff Sachs would 
receive a usual and customary finder's fee for his efforts. A usual and customary fee for 
assisting in locating a buyer for a company is 3% of the sale price of the corporation. See, 
Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, f 16, R. 1323; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, If 16, R. 1627; Verified 
Complaint, 1(28-29, R. 6; Sachs Dep. R. 1357, 1373, at 95:23-96:16; 1384-1386145:8-
148:8; 149:15-150:5; Tesch Memo, R. 1484. 
11. Plaintiff Sachs does not have a real estate broker's license and was not 
acting as a broker, but as a professional business finder, in locating a buyer for UPCM, a 
New York Stock Exchange company, in response to Lesser's request. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. 
L&L, H63, R. 1331; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, |63, R. 1634; Sachs Dep. R. 1357, 1384-
1385, 147:20-148:8. 
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12. Following the May 2, 2001 meeting with Lesser, Plaintiff Sachs contacted 
several individuals to purchase UPCM, including Jackson. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, 
fl9, R. 1324; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, f 19, R. 1627; Verified Complaint, p 3 , R. 7; Sachs 
Dep. R. 1357, 1371-1372 at 88:1-90:14; 90:25-92:19. 
13. On the morning of May 17, 2001, Plaintiff Sachs delivered a letter to 
Rothwell regarding Sachs' prior introduction of Granite and the finder's fee he expected 
for locating a joint venturer or buyer for UPCM, stating 
I write to remind you that I will expect a modest finder's fee if an 
agreement comes to fruition. This could be cash, a couple of prime 
developed lots in the new project, or some other consideration 
acceptable to both of us. While I believe we have an understanding as 
to this finder's fee, I do think that matters of this sort ought to be out 
on the table early on, and I hope you feel the same. Please let me 
know if you have any questions concerning such a finder's fee. 
See, Pltf Mem. Op. L&L, f27, R. 1325-1326; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, ^|27, R. 1629; 
Verified Complaint, fflJ43, R. 9; Letter to Rothwell from Sachs, R. 1478; Sachs Dep., R. 
1357, 1383-1384, at 141:11-143:6; 1386 at 152:23-153:13; Rothwell Dep., R. 1391, 1395 
at 152:7-18. 
14. Plaintiff Sachs' letter of May 17, 2001, was received by Rothwell and 
transmitted to Lesser. Later that afternoon, Lesser telephoned Sachs. Responding to 
Sachs' indication in the letter that Sachs would direct his efforts to finding a "potential 
buyer" or "joint venturer" for UPCM, Lesser adamantly told Sachs that, "I don't want a 
joint venture partner. I want this sold." Lesser directed Sachs to refer any prospective 
purchasers of UPCM to Rothwell. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, 1HJ30-31, R. 1326; Pltf. 
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Mem. Op. UPCM, ffi[30-31, R. 1629; Verified Complaint, 1fl[44-45, R. 9; Sachs Dep., R. 
1357, 1387-1388 at 156:19-157:23; 159:21-161:24. 
15. The following day, May 18, 2001, Sachs delivered a second letter to 
Rothwell by facsimile, confirming Lesser's preference for a purchaser for UPCM 
expressed in Lesser's phone call to Sachs on May 17, 2001. In the letter, Sachs further 
stated that, "If your company's preference is sale, Granite, as I suggested in yesterday's 
letter is still an excellent prospect. Another investor, together with Granite, would make 
an excellent purchaser. I am happy to re-direct my focus to obtaining such a joint venture 
purchaser. Obviously, I will keep you apprised of all proposals, whether for sale or for a 
joint venturing of the project." Rothwell and Lesser never responded to this letter or 
informed Sachs they would not pay the finder's fee Sachs had indicated he would charge 
for his services in the letter of May 17, 2001. See, Letter to Rothwell from Sachs dated 
May 18, 2001, R. 1453; Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, ^[33, R. 1326; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, ^[33, 
R. 1630; Verified Complaint, 1J45, R. 9; Sachs Dep., R. 1357, 1387-1388 at 154:13-
158:11; R. 1390 at 210:1-211:4; Rothwell Dep. R. 1391, 1396 at 167:21-168:3. 
16. At all relevant times, Jackson resided in Park City, Utah. Although not 
licensed as a real estate broker, Jackson has been a real estate developer in the Park City 
area for over fifteen years. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, [^66, R. 1331; Pltf. Mem. Op. 
UPCM, f66, R. 1634; Jackson Dep., R. 1454, 1455 at 5:6-24; 1457, at 15:10-17; 1465 at 
108:5-109:12. 
17. Plaintiff Sachs initially telephoned Jackson in early June 2000 and reached 
Jackson in New York. Jackson expressed immediate interest in the information that 
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Sachs provided him concerning the new opportunity to purchase UPCM that existed 
based on the information Lesser had conveyed to Sachs in their meeting on May 2, 2001. 
See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, ffi|20-21, R. 1324; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, 1fl[20-2l, R. 1627-
1628; Verified Complaint, ffi[33-35, R- 7 ; S a c h s DeP-> R- 1357> 1376-1378, at 112:22-
118:12; Jackson Dep. R. 1454, 1457-1459 at 17:23-18:16; 22:9-18. 
18. On July 31,2001, Jackson formed Capital Growth Partners ("Capital"), a 
Utah limited liability company, involving a group of investors, for the express purpose of 
purchasing UPCM by acquiring 100% of the capital stock of UPCM. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. 
L&L, flU, R. 1327; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, fU, R. 1631; Verified Complaint, f51, R.10; 
Jackson Dep., R. 1454, 1456-1457 at 12:5-13:23; 16:5-17:4; Merger Agreement, under 
heading "Background of the Merger", R. 153 8. 
19. On October 25, 2001, Capital entered into a non-disclosure agreement with 
DRKW, an investment banking firm hired by UPCM to facilitate the purchase of UPCM. 
See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, ^44, R. 1328; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, f44, R. 1631; Verified 
Complaint, [^56, R. 11; See also, Merger Agreement, under heading "Background of the 
Merger", R. 1527 (sixth paragraph). 
20. On February 21, 2002, Capital offered to purchase UPCM from its current 
shareholders, including the stock of Loeb Investors, for $25 per share, for a total of 
approximately $81.3 million. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, f!5, R. 1328; Pltf. Mem. Op. 
UPCM, TJ45, R. 1631; See also, Merger Agreement, under heading "Background of the 
Merger", R. 1528 ffi3-4). 
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21. Thereafter, in March and April, 2002, Plaintiff Sachs personally contacted 
Defendants concerning the payment of his finder's fee which Defendamts refused to pay. 
See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, f!6, R. 1328; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, fl6, R. 1631; Verified 
Complaint, 1ffl59-64, R. 11-12; Sachs Affidavit, ffl[39-40, R. 1770. 
22. Lesser agrees that Plaintiff Sachs would have been entitled to a finder's fee 
if Granite had purchased UPCM or if Sachs had located Jackson to purchase UPCM, but 
denies that Plaintiff Sachs found Jackson to purchase UPCM. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, 
ffi[55, 61, R. 1329-1330; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, ffi[55, 61, R. 1632-1634; Lesser Dep. R. 
1399, 1411-1412 at 129:6 -130:17. 
23. On or about June 16, 2003, Jackson, through Capital, completed a merger 
with UPCM, by purchasing "all of the outstanding common stock" of UPCM, for $21 
per share, for a total of $67.2 million. In the merger, UPCM became a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Capital. UPCM was the surviving corporation in the merger and retained all 
of its assets and liabilities, including its real estate assets. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, [^49, 
R. 1328; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, |49, R. 1632; Verified Complaint, f82, R. 14; Jackson 
Dep., R. 892, 900, at 80:10-20; Rothwell Dep., R. 1391, 1396, at 169:3-25; Agreement 
and Plan of Merger and Article I, Sec. 1.01 (a)-(d), R. 901-902. 
24. Subsequently, Plaintiff Sachs made additional requests to UPCM for the 
payment of his fmderfs fee for locating Jackson to purchase UPCM, but Defendants also 
denied these requests. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, ffi[51-55, R. 1329; Pltf. Mem. Op. 
UPCM, 1J51-55, R. 1632-1633; Verified Complaint, 1fl[81-86, R. 14-15; Sachs Affidavit, 
|^44? R. 1449. 
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25. The merger of UPCM and Capital was a complicated commercial 
transaction in which the parties' interests were represented by numerous attorneys and 
consultants. Defendants were also represented by DRKW, an investment banking firm. 
See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, 11J66-67, R. 1331; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, ffl[66-67, R. 1634; 
Merger Agreement, "Information Statement", R. 1521-1533; Lesser Dep. R. 1399, 1403, 
at 36:18-37:4; Jackson Dep. R. 1454, 1457, at 15:10-17. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I Sachs' Agreement To Find A Buyer For The Stock Of UPCM For A 
Fee Is Not A "Real Estate" Transaction under UREBA. Thus, UREBA 
Does Not Bar Sachs' Claims For Breach of Implied Contract Because 
Sachs Was Not Licensed As A Real Estate Broker Under UREBA 
Applying familiar rules of statutory construction declared by this Court, the Utah 
Court of Appeals correctly reversed the lower court's summary judgment and dismissal 
of Plaintiff Sachs' implied contract claims against Defendants. The Court of Appeals 
reached this decision based on its conclusion that Sachs' agreement to find a buyer for 
100% of the stock of UPCM, a publicly held corporation, in exchange for a finder's fee, 
where the corporation retained its real property assets in the transaction, involves only 
stock which is recognized as "personal property" under Utah law, such that the agreement 
is not a "business opportunity involving real property" within the definition of "real 
estate" under §61-2-2 (14) of UREBA. 
Although Defendants assail the Utah Court of Appeals' decision with a scattershot 
of claims to the effect that the phrase "business opportunity involving real property" in 
UREBA should be interpreted as encompassing transactions exclusively involving 
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corporate stock, many of these claims were never presented, briefed or argued in the 
district court or in the Court of Appeals. Thus, the Court should decline to consider these 
new claims on certiorari. 
Defendants also fail to counter the Utah Court of Appeals' conclusions that the 
rules of statutory construction, legislative history, purposes and policies of UREBA, the 
long established treatment of stock as personal property and not real property under Utah 
law, as well as the due process notice required to be afforded citizens concerning conduct 
punishable as civil and criminal offenses under UREBA, all support the Court of 
Appeals' interpretation of UREBA. Accordingly, the Court should affirm the Utah Court 
of Appeals' decision that UREBA does not bar Sachs' claims for breach of implied 
contract. 
II Sachs' Agreement To Find A Buyer For The Stock Of A 
Corporation For A Fee Is Not An "Agreement Involving The Sale 
Or Purchase Of Real Estate" Under §25-5-4 of the Utah Statute Of 
Frauds. Thus, the Statute Does Not Bar Plaintiff Sachs' Claims For 
Breach of Implied Contract 
The Court of Appeals correctly held that even accepting, without deciding, 
Defendants' argument that the definition of "real estate" in UREBA should be read "in 
para materia" to supply the definition of "real estate" in §25-5-4(1 )(e) of the Utah statute 
of frauds, Sachs' agreement to find a buyer for the stock of UPCM involves only 
"personal property" and not the "the purchase or sale of real property" under §25-5-4. 
This conclusion is buttressed by the facts that there is nothing in the Utah statute of 
frauds indicating that it is intended to be defined according to the terms of UREBA, and 
that §70A-8-l 12 prohibits the application of the statute of frauds to contracts for the sale 
14 
of securities. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the Utah Court of Appeals' decision 
that the Utah statute of frauds does not bar Sachs' claims against Defendants for breach 
of implied contract. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I UREBA DOES NOT BAR PLAINTIFF SACHS5 CLAIMS FOR 
BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT BECAUSE UREBA DOES 
NOT REQUIRE A REAL ESTATE BROKER LICENSE TO 
ENGAGE IN TRANSACTIONS DEALING EXCLUSIVELY IN 
CORPORATE STOCK 
A, An Agreement To Find A Buyer For A Corporation's Stock In Exchange For 
A Fee Is Not Regulated Under UREBA 
Plaintiff Sachs does not dispute Defendants' arguments that one must be licensed 
as a real estate broker to recover a fee for finding a buyer for the real property assets of a 
corporation under UREBA, or that this Court so held in Diversified General Corp. v. 
White Barn Golf Course, 584 P.2d 848, 849, 852 (Utah 1978) (Def. Br. 14, n.4). In this 
case, however, Plaintiff Sachs never offered or agreed to find a buyer for any business, or 
any real property assets of UPCM, and Lesser, on behalf of Loeb and UPCM, only 
requested Plaintiff Sachs to find a buyer for the corporation. See, Plaintiffs Statement of 
Facts, supra, ffi|8-20, 22,23, 25, at 7-13; See also, Sachs Dep., R. 1357, 1385 at 147:12-
148:8. It is also undisputed that the buyer Plaintiff Sachs claims he found to purchase 
UPCM, acquired the corporation by purchasing 100% of UPCM's common stock in a 
merger in which UPCM was the surviving corporation and retained its real property 
assets. (Rothwell Dep., R. 1381, 1396, at 169:25; Agreement and Plan of Merger and 
Article I, §1.01 (a)-(d), R. 901-902.) Thus, whereas Diversified involved an action by a 
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corporation to collect a finder's fee for locating a purchaser for the vendor's "real 
property" Id. at 848, the instant case involves exclusively the sale of corporate stock, 
which the Court of Appeals correctly held is "personal property" and not "real property" 
within the definition of "real estate" in §61-2-2(14) of UREBA.2 Sachs, 1J40-43 
Similarly, the facts that "UPCM's only significant asset consisted of land" (Def. 
Br. 14), and that "Sachs did not have a real estate broker's license at the time he found a 
buyer for UPCM" (Def. Br. 14-15), do not preclude Sachs' finder's fee agreement as 
Defendants contend, because the agreement only involved the sale of UPCM's stock, and 
did not involve the sale of any land owned by UPCM for which a broker's license would 
be required under UREBA. Sachs, 1fl3, 40 
Defendants further argue that, "Sachs alleges that he was the procuring cause of 
UPCM's sale." (Def. Br. 14) However, this allegation only refers to Sachs' 
representation that he "procured" a buyer for UPCM. (Letter from Sachs to Rothwell, R. 
1289; Sachs Dep., R. 1357, 1385 at 147:12-148:8) As Defendants admit, the terms of the 
sale of UPCM "were negotiated and concluded without Sachs' involvement" and 
"consummated as a corporate merger in which Capital purchased all outstanding shares 
of UPCM's corporate stock." (Def. Br. 14). These admissions are significant because, as 
the Court of Appeals explained, "The term 'procuring cause' has different meanings with 
respect to finders and brokers, and that to recover a fee as a finder, Plaintiff Sachs "need 
2 The events of this case occurred during 2001-2002. However, the definition of "real 
estate" in UREBA in §61-2-2(14) has not changed in the interim. Thus, the Utah Court of 
Appeals refers to the 2006 version of UREBA. See, Sachs, 1fl[33-34, 48, n.23. 
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only demonstrate that he introduced the parties who eventually consummated the 
transaction." Sachs, ffif 28-29 
Accordingly, none of the facts asserted by Defendants (Def. Mem. 13-15), 
demonstrate that the Utah Court of Appeals erred in deciding that the sale of UPCM's 
stock is not a "business opportunity involving real property" under the definition of "real 
estate" in §61-2-2(14) of UREBA, and that Plaintiff Sachs is not required to be licensed 
under UREBA to enforce his finder's fee agreement with Defendants. 
B. The Phrase "Business Opportunity Involving Real Property" Is Ambiguous 
Defendants assert that the Utah Court of Appeals erred in finding that the phrase 
"business opportunity involving real estate" is ambiguous. (Def. Mem. 16) This argument 
is incorrect. 
As the Court of Appeals observed, "Neither the term 'business opportunity' nor 
the phrase 'business opportunity involving real property' used in the definition of 'real 
estate' is further defined in this chapter." Sachs, p 6 , ("Real estate... include[s] 
leaseholds and business opportunities involving real property."), citing §61-2-2(14), 
Addendum 2. The subject phrase is also distinguishable from the terms "business" and 
"corporation." These terms are also undefined in UREBA. Id. 
Additionally, the Court of Appeals noted that the parties advanced two conflicting 
interpretations of the subject phrase: 
Defendants assume that the proper inquiry [under the phrase "business 
opportunity involving real property"] is whether the ongoing business 
being conveyed engages in commercial activities involving real 
property. In contrast, Sachs argues that the sale of UPCM fell outside 
UREBA's definition of real estate because only stock was sold. 
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Sachs, f 36. 
Confronted with conflicting interpretations and the undefined terms in the subject 
phrase, the Utah Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the phrase "business 
opportunities involving real property" is ambiguous, based on its finding that, 
[W]hen we consider the plain language of the Act in its entirety, it is 
unclear from that language alone whether Sachs was required to 
comply with UREBA when finding a buyer for all of UPCM's stock. 
Sachs, \ 38; See also, Utah Public Employees Ass 'n v. State, 2006 UT 9, ^[33, 131 P.3d 
208, 216 ("Absent clear language regarding or an obvious interpretation of [the statutory 
language] ..., we conclude that the statutory language is ambiguous. It is clearly capable 
of more than one logical meaning within the statutory scheme.") 
The fact that the Utah Court of Appeals held that the sale of UPCM's stock was 
not barred by UREBA while the district court held that it was, also demonstrates that the 
definition of "real estate" in UREBA is "susceptible of two interpretations" and is thus 
ambiguous. Bluffdale Mountain Homes, LC v. Bluffdale City, 2007 UT 57, ^69, 167 P.3d 
1016, 1035 (cited Def. Br. 16) ("The term 'unincorporated area' as used in this statute is 
ambiguous in that it is susceptible to two interpretations."); Li v. Zhang, 2005 UT App 
246, \ 8, 120 P.3d 30, 32, affd, Li v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Utah, 2006 UT 80, 
150 P.3d 471 ("However, this existence of two reasonable, yet conflicting, 
interpretations of the statute renders it ambiguous.") Accordingly, Defendants' argument 
that the Utah Court of Appeals erred in finding that the phrase "business opportunities 
involving real estate" is ambiguous, is incorrect and must be rejected. 
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C. Defendants' Interpretation Of The Phrase "Business Opportunities Involving 
Real Property" Renders the Word "Opportunities" Meaningless In Violation 
of Basic Rules of Statutory Construction 
Defendants argue that the proper inquiry under the phrase "business opportunities 
involving real property, " is whether an existing, ongoing business engages in 
commercial activities involving real property. (Def. Br. 15) See also, Sachs, f36. 
The Court of Appeals soundly rejected this interpretation, reasoning that, 
Had the legislature defined real estate to include businesses involving 
real property, we would agree that UREBA is applicable. The plain 
language of the statute, however, includes only business 
opportunities. See, Utah Code Ann. §61-2-2(14). Thus, Defendants' 
interpretation would render the word 'opportunities' meaningless, 
something we must avoid when possible. 
Sachs, 1J1|38-39, citing Carter v. University of Utah Med. Ctr., 2006 UT 78,1J9 
("Determining the legislature's intent requires that we seek to render all parts [of the 
statute] relevant and meaningful and we accordingly avoid interpretations that will render 
portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative.") 
D. The Ordinary Meaning of "Business Opportunities Involving Real Property" 
Does Not Include The Sale of Corporate Stock Where the Corporation 
Retains Its Real Estate Assets In The Transaction 
Defendants belatedly claim that the Court of Appeals was constrained to interpret 
the phrase "business opportunities involving real property" according to the default 
definition of "real property" in §68-3-12(2)(k), and the dictionary definitions of the 
individual words "business" and "opportunities" supplied by Defendants, thereby 
purportedly avoiding ambiguity in the subject phrase. (Def. Br. 16-18) Defendants did 
not present, brief or argue these specific definitions in the district court or in the Court of 
Appeals. See, L&L: R. 1082-1083, 1124-1129, 2068-2082; UPCM: R. 1206-1207, 1218-
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1223, 1986-1995; L&L Ct. App. Br. 19-36; UPCM Ct App. Br. 15-33. Thus, this Court 
should decline to consider them. "With limited exceptions, the practice of this court has 
been to decline consideration of issues raised for the first time on appeal." Tindley v. Salt 
Lake City School Disl, 2005 UT 30,1J10, n. 2, 116 P.3d 295, quoting Espinal v. Salt Lake 
City Bd. ofEduc, 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990). If the rule were otherwise, a party 
addressing a motion for summary judgment could, as in the instant case, withhold a slew 
of issues and arguments until the highest level of appeal, forcing the opposing party to 
address them in the strictures of the appellate briefing schedule. 
Defendants also failed to comply with U.R.App.P. 24(a)(9), which requires parties 
to include in their appellate briefs, "the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in 
the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied 
upon." In their opening brief, Defendants fail to advance any grounds on which this Court 
should consider the new claims Defendants failed to present or brief in the lower courts. 
For this additional reason, the Court should decline to consider Defendants' argument on 
this point and the other new claims asserted for the first time on certiorari. 
Alternatively, and without waiving the foregoing argument, Defendants5 argument 
on this point (Def. Br. 16-18), is unavailing. If anything, the default definition of "real 
estate" and "real property" in §68-3-12(2)(k), as meaning "land, hereditaments, water 
rights, possessory rights, and claims" (Def. Br. 16), supports the exclusion of corporate 
stock transactions from the phrase "business opportunities involving real property" in 
§61-2-2(14), because there is no reference to stock transactions in the default definitions 
of these terms. 
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Indeed, transactions involving only corporate stock fall within the default 
definition of "personal property" in §68-3-12(2)(p), which includes "every description of 
money, goods, chattels, effects, evidence of rights in action, and all written instruments 
by which any pecuniary obligation, right, or title to property is created, acknowledged, 
transferred, increased, defeated, discharged, or diminished, and every right or interest 
therein." See also, Sachs, f41, quoting §16-10a-102(33) (2005) (defining "shares" in a 
corporation to mean "the units into which the proprietary interests in a corporation are 
divided.") 
Although courts "frequently consults] dictionary definitions to assess the 
'ordinary meaning' of an otherwise undefined term" (Def. Br. 17), Defendants5 attempt 
to interpret the phrase "business opportunities involving real property" soley by reference 
to definitions for the individual words in the phrase, apart from the other provisions of 
UREBA and its statutory purpose, violates basic laws of statutory interpretation. "We 
read the plain language of a statute ... as a whole and interpret its provisions in harmony 
with other provisions in the same statute and with other statutes under the same and 
related chapters." Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, f7, 162 P.3d 1099 (Internal citations 
omitted); Sachs, [^39, n. 15, ("[U]pon finding that the plain language of a statute is 
ambiguous, we are free to 'look to other interpretive tools.' Utah State Tax Comm yn v. 
Stevenson, 2006 UT 84,1J32, 150 P.3d 521.") 
Thus, the Court of Appeals was not required to adopt Defendants' proposed 
definitions for the words in the phrase "business opportunities involving real property" 
used in the definition of "real estate" under §61-2-2(14), where Defendants never 
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presented, briefed or argued these definitions in the district court or the Utah Court of 
Appeals, and other accepted interpretive tools of statutory construction satisfied the Court 
of Appeals that its interpretation of the statutory phrase was correct. Sachs, ^[37-42 
(discussing rules of statutory construction applied by Court of Appeals) 
E. The Phrase "Business Opportunities Involving Real Property" Should Not Be 
Interpreted According To The Prior Deleted Statutory Definition of 
"Business Opportunity" 
1. The Prior Deleted Statutory Definition Of "Business Opportunity" Is 
Ambiguous And Would Not Resolve The Issue Of Statutory 
Interpretation Presented In This Case Even If Adopted 
Defendants also belatedly claim that "[i]f this Court concludes the phrase 
'business opportunities involving real property' is ambiguous, the legislative history of 
the key provisions of UREBA compels this Court to apply a definition consonant with the 
previous statutory definition [of "business opportunity]." (Def. Br. 18) Defendants cite 
no legal authority to support this claim and failed to present, brief or airgue this claim in 
the district court or in the Court of Appeals. See, L&L: R. 1082-1083, 1124-1129, 2068-
2082; UPCM: R. 1206-1207, 1218-1223, 1986-1995; L&L Ct. App. Br. 19-36; UPCM 
Ct. App. Br. 15-33. Thus, the Court should decline to consider it. "With limited 
exceptions, the practice of this court has been to decline consideration of issues raised for 
the first time on appeal." Tindley v. Salt Lake City School Dist, 2005 QT 30, f^lO, n. 2, 
116 P.3d 295, 298, quoting Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd ofEduc, 797 P.2d 412, 413 
(Utah 1990). 
Alternatively, and without waiving the foregoing argument, Defendants' argument 
on this point is incorrect. Defendants fail to acknowledge that the definition of "business 
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opportunity" that existed prior to the 1985 amendments to UREBA, which then included 
"an existing business and its good will," is itself ambiguous, such that its application 
would not resolve the issue of statutory interpretation presented in the instant case. See, 
1963 Amendments, at 11-13; 1983 Amendments, at 14, 16, Addendum 3. 
In 1978, the Utah Attorney General issued an informal opinion responding to a 
query from the Department of Business Regulation asking whether the purchase of a 
corporation's stock was a "business opportunity", a securities transaction, or neither. See, 
Informal Opinion No. 78-233, 1978 WL 257892 (Utah A.G.), Addendum 8. 
Construing the 1963 version of UREBA which then defined the term "business 
opportunity" as including "an existing business and its good will," the Attorney General 
concluded that the definition of "business opportunity" was ambiguous, observing that, 
"[B]ut the statute does not specify what type of sale of a business opportunity would be 
so subject, whether the assets of a business must be sold or merely a controlling share in 
the corporation." The Attorney General further opined that 
A Utah court would probably find a sale of controlling share of stock 
in a corporation too far removed in nature from a real estate 
transaction to fall within the term 'real estate' as defined by Section 
21-2-2. There are too many variables involved in determining what 
constitutes a sale of control of a corporation. Less tha[n] 51% may be 
sufficient to control for certain purposes. To avoid any disputes 
which may arise from the nebulous definition of the term 'control' it 
would be best to adopt a mechanical rule to the effect that only sales 
of assets of a business qualify as a sale of a 'business opportunity' 
under the statute. 
Id. at I. 
Because application of the statutory definition of "business opportunity" that 
existed prior to the 1985 amendments to UREBA repealing this definition, would not 
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resolve the ambiguity of the statute for the reasons cited by the Attorney General, 
Defendants' untimely argument that the Court of Appeals erred in not adopting the 
deleted definition, is incorrect and must be rejected. 
2. The Court of Appeals Was Not Required To Apply The Prior 
Statutory Definition Of "Business Opportunity" Deleted By The 
Legislature 
Notwithstanding Defendants' contrary argument (Def. Br. 18-21), a court is not 
required to interpret a statutory provision in a manner that is consistent with a previous 
statutory provision when the prior statutory provision has been repealed. See, Bourgeous 
v. State, 2002 UT App 5, \\1, 41 P.3d 461, citing §68-3-5 (2000): "The repeal of a statute 
does not revive a statute previously repealed." 
In determining the meaning of the term "real estate" in §61-2-2(14), "we assume 
that 'the expression of one should be interpreted as the exclusion of the other.'" 
Bourgeous, %L\, quoting Biddle v. Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 110, [^14, 993 P.2d 
875. Thus, had the legislature intended the pre-1985 definition of "real estate" in §61-2-
2(14), which included "an existing business, a business and its good will, a business 
franchise, or any combination of them" to be utilized in the current version of UREBA, it 
would not have deleted this definition in the 1985 amendments to UREBA and added the 
qualifying phrase "involving real property" to the term "business opportunities" in the 
definition of "real estate" contained in §61-2-2(14). Sachs, ffif38-39 
Legislative events prior to the adoption of the 1985 amendments to UREBA also 
support the Court of Appeals' decision that the definition of "real estate" in §61-2-2(14), 
excludes the sale of corporate stock. As the Court of Appeals explains, the 1985 
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amendments to UREBA followed in the wake of 1983 legislation that split real estate 
licensing and enforcement from securities licensing and enforcement. Sachs, ^[47-48 
Thus, to further implement this reorganization, "in 1985, the Utah Legislature contracted 
the scope of the real estate broker's act in two ways. First, it narrowed the definition of 
real estate by including the limiting phrase "involving real property".... Second, it 
deleted "existing business, business and the good will attached thereto or any one of a 
combination thereof from the expansive definition of "business opportunity." Sachs, Tf48 
The legislature's determination to govern real estate and securities under different 
chapters of the Utah Code, and the legislature's creation of exemptions effectively 
abolishing the need for dual licensing in transactions in which real estate is a necessary 
element of a security, also support the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the legislature 
did not intend to encompass the sale of a corporation's stock under the phrase "a business 
opportunity involving real property" used in the definition of "real estate" under §61-2-
2(14) of UREBA. Sachs, ffi[47- 48> n- 23-
In light of the Defendants' failure to counter the foregoing legislative history (Def. 
Br. 18-21), Defendants' argument that the current version of UREBA "expands" the 
definition of "real estate" from its pre-1985 definition and "signals the legislature's 
intention to apply UREBA's licensing requirements to a wider class of real estate-related 
transactions"(Def. Br. 17), is untenable. 
Even employing a "broad interpretation" of UREBA as Defendants urge, (Def. Br. 
17-18), the usual and accepted meaning of the phrase "business opportunities involving 
real property" used to define the term "real estate" in §61-2-2(14) of UREBA, would not 
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be commonly understood as encompassing the act of finding a buyer for the stock of a 
publicly traded corporation. Sachs, ffi[37-39 
Additionally, given the well understood distinction between corporate stock sales 
and asset sales under Utah law, e.g., Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc v. Dixie Power & 
Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 26 (Utah 1990), Decius v. Action Collection Serv., 2004 UT 
App 484, TJ8, 105 P.3d 956, had the legislature wished to abolish this distinction in 
UREBA, it would have specifically declared this intent in the Act. That no such intention 
is declared in UREBA further confirms the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the 
legislature did not intend to encompass the sale of corporate stock in the definition of 
"real estate" in UREBA. Sachs, [^48, n.23, citing Bertha v. Remy International, Inc., 414 
F.Supp.2d 869, 877-878 (Wis. 2006) (Rejecting argument that Wisconsin legislature 
would have included stock sales in definition of "real estate" in its real estate broker act 
without specifically stating its intention to do so, given well established distinction 
between stock sales and asset sales under Wisconsin law.) 
Based on the legislative history, the Court of Appeals correctly reasoned that 
Prior to 1985, it may have been proper to substitute the terms 'existing 
business' for the phrase 'business opportunities' in the definition of 
'real estate', and then to inquire whether the existing business's 
activities involved real property[,] [hjowever, since the 1985 
amendments, inquiry is no longer appropriate. Instead, the proper 
inquiry is to examine the specific character of the business 
opportunity and to determine whether that opportunity involved real 
property. 
Sachs, 1f39 
Consequently, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the sale of UPCM's 
corporate stock is not a "business opportunity involving real property'' under UREBA, 
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following this Court's long established practice of refusing to import substantive terms 
into statutes.3 Sachs, f^f[39, 49 
3. Defendants' Claim That The Court of Appeals Relied On Incomplete 
Legislative History Was Not Presented In The Lower Courts. Thus, 
The Court Should Decline To Consider This Claim 
Defendants alternatively argue that the Court of Appeals "relied on an incomplete 
record of UREBA's legislative history in reaching the foregoing conclusion." (Def. Br. 
15). This claim is based on statements of sponsors of the 1985 amendments to UREBA, 
which Defendants failed to present, brief or argue in the district court or in the Court of 
Appeals. (Def. Br. 21-25) Thus, Defendants are in no position to criticize the Court of 
Appeals for failing to consider this claim. (Def. Br. 15) As this Court has often stated: 
"[T]his court is not a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of 
argument and research." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). 
Because Defendants failed to present, brief or argue this claim in the district court 
or in the Court of Appeals, the Court should decline to consider it. See, L&L: R. 1082-
1083, 1124-1129, 2068-2082; UPCM: R. 1206-1207, 1218-1223, 1986-1995; L&L Ct. 
See, e.g., Andersen v. Johnson, 160 P.2d 725, 729 (Utah 1945) (Refusing to expand 
the definitions of "real estate broker" and "real estate" in prior version of UREBA by 
implication to require licensure for individual assisting licensed broker dealer in 
obtaining listing); Chase v. Morgan, 339 P.2d 1019, 1021 (1951) (Holding that had the 
Utah legislature not expressly included the terms "leasehold and other interest less than 
leaseholds" in the definition of "real estate" in UREBA, the Court would likely have 
interpreted the term "real estate" in UREBA [referring to a prior version of UREBA] as 
not including oil and gas leases); IML. v. State of Utah, 2002 UT 110, ^ }25 ("We will not 
infer substantive terms into the text that are not already there. Rather, the interpretation 
must be based on the language used, and we have no power to rewrite the statute to 
conform to an intention not expressed.") (Internal citations and modifications omitted). 
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App. Br. 19-36; UPCM Ct. App. Br. 15-33. Tindley v. Salt Lake City School Dist., 2005 
UT 30,1J10, 116 P.3d 295, 298, quoting, Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. ofEduc, 797 P.2d 
412, 413 (Utah 1990) ("With limited exceptions, the practice of this court has been to 
decline consideration of issues raised for the first time on appeal."); See also, State v. 
Garcia, 2007 UT App 228, \\2, 164 P.3d 1264 (refusing to address a legal argument 
raised for the first time on appeal). 
4. The 1985 Amendments To UREBA Deleting The Definition Of 
"Business Opportunity" and Adding The Words "Involving Real 
Property" To Qualify The Term "Business Opportunities" In The 
Definition Of "Real Estate" In §61-2-2(14) Are Substantive 
Alternatively, and without waiving the foregoing arguments, Defendants' claims 
regarding the "legislative history" they contend the Court of Appeals failed to consider 
(Def. Br. 21-25), are unavailing. Under Utah law "[E]very amendment not expressly 
characterized as a clarification carries a rebuttable presumption that it is intended to 
change existing legal rights and liabilities." State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 601 (Utah App. 
1992), quoting State v. Amador, 804 P.2d 1233, 1234 (Utah App. 1990); See also, 
Madsen v. Borthrick, 769 P.2d 245, 252 n.l 1 (Utah 1988). 
Defendants quote the statements of sponsors of the 1985 amendments describing 
certain of the amendments as "clarifying what they did back in 1983" (Def. Br. 22) 
(Emphasis supplied), referring to legislative action relating to the 1983 reorganization 
removing real estate licensing and enforcement from the aegis of the state securities 
commission. However, this does not mean that the 1985 amendments to UREBA at issue 
in this case, namely: (1) the deletion of the then-existing definition of "business 
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opportunities", and (2) the addition of the phrase "involving real property" to the term 
"business opportunities" used in defining "real estate" in §61-2-2(14), are not substantive 
per se. These amendments are clearly substantive because their effect was to further limit 
the type of transactions for which a real estate license is required under UREBA. Sachs, 
ffi[47- 48 Thus, Defendants fail to make any persuasive argument for disregarding the 
presumption that an amendment is intended to change existing legal rights. See, Madsen 
v. Borthrick, 769 P.2d 245, 252, n.l 1 (Utah 1988), citing 1A Singer, Sutherland on 
Statutory Construction §22.30 (Sands 4th rev. ed. 1985). 
Defendants' argument that the 1985 amendments to UREBA at issue here are not 
substantive, (Def. Br. 23-25), such that the controlling definition of "business 
opportunities involving real property" is purportedly to be found in the repealed 
definition of "business opportunity" in the 1983 version of UREBA, also transgresses a 
fundamental rule of statutory interpretation. This rule assumes that assumes the 
legislature acted advisedly in enacting these amendments and that the 1983 statute should 
not be interpreted in a manner that renders the 1985 amendments superfluous. Sachs, 
f39; See also, Madsen, supra, at 252, n.l 1; Visitor Information Center Authority of 
Grand County v. Customer Service Div., Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 930 P.2d 1196, 1198 
(Utah 1997) ("The fact that the legislature felt that this change was necessary, however, 
provides no support for reading the plain language of the statute as it existed prior to 
1996 to make this amendment superfluous. Later versions of a statute do not necessarily 
reveal the intent behind an earlier version.") (Internal citations omitted). 
29 
Defendants also seek to bolster their new claim by quoting Justice Nehring's 
concurring opinion in Utah Public Employees Ass 'n v. Utah, 2006 UT 9,1J93, 131 P.3d 
208 (Def. Br. 23) (note: the quoted language actually appears in ^92 of Public 
Employees). Justice Nehring opined that the fact that neither the sponsors nor the 
legislators discussing the amendment to the statute at issue in Public Employees indicated 
that the amendment was intended to modify the substance of the pre-aimendment 
language, supported an interpretation of the amendment consistent with pre-amendment 
law, where the concept omitted in the amendment remained in another provision of the 
amended statute. Id. [^97. Here, however, the definition of "business opportunities" 
deleted in the 1985 amendments to UREBA is not retained in another provision of 
UREBA. Sachs, [^38 Thus, Public Employees does not apply. See also, Sill v. Hart, 2007 
UT 45, Ifl 1, n.3, ffi[12-13, 162 P.3d 1099 (Declining to ignore limiting language provided 
in legislative amendment and overall purpose of statutory scheme in interpreting statute.) 
Defendants further argue that "[H|ere, the legislature did not remove the term 
'business opportunities' from the definition of'real estate', it simply deleted the 
definition of 'business opportunity,'" and that "[h]ad the legislature intended to remove 
the term... from the definition of real estate, it would have done so in 1985 [or 
succeeding years]." (Def. Br. 25) True enough, but these points are not in contention. 
The issue is here is how the phrase "business opportunities involving real property" in 
§61-2-2(14) should be interpreted in light of the fact that in 1985, the legislature 
affirmatively repealed the definition of "business opportunities" that existed prior to the 
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1985 amendments to UREBA and added the phrase "involving real property" to qualify 
the term "business opportunities" in defining "real estate" under §61-2-2(14). 
Based on the legislative history, the Court of Appeals properly concluded that the 
legislature no longer intended to define the phrase "business opportunities" as it had in 
1983, and that the proper inquiry under the phrase "business opportunities involving real 
property" in §61-2-2(14) of the amended version of UREBA, "is to examine the specific 
character of the business opportunity and to determine whether that opportunity involved 
real property." Sachs, ^39 Under the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals properly 
determined that "the business opportunity at issue is the purchase of all of UPCM's 
capital stock." Id. 1J40. 
F. Defendants' Claim That The Judiciary Should Defer To The Real Estate 
Commission's Definition of "Business Opportunities" Was Not Presented In 
The Lower Courts And This Court Should Decline To Consider It. 
Alternatively, The Claim Is Inapplicable Under The Facts Of This Case 
Defendants claim that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to defer to the Real 
Estate Commission's interpretation of the term "business opportunities." (Def. Br. 26-28) 
The Court should decline to consider this claim because Defendants never asserted, 
briefed or argued this claim in the district court or in the Utah Court of Appeals, See, 
L&L:R. 1082-1083, 1124-1129, 2068-2082; UPCM: R. 1206-1207, 1218-1223, 1986-
1995; L&L Ct. App. Br. 19-36; UPCM Ct. App. Br. 15-33. Tindley v. Salt Lake City 
School Dist., 2005 UT 30, flO, 116 P.3d 295, 298, quoting, Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd 
ofEduc., 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990). Alternatively, and without waiving the 
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foregoing argument, Plaintiff Sachs submits that Defendants' argument on this point is 
incorrect and inapplicable to the facts in this case. 
Defendants argue that, "The legislature explicitly granted the Real Estate 
Commission rulemaking authority to administer UREBA, or, alternatively, implicitly 
granted the Commission authority to define the term 'business opportunity' by removing 
the definition of the term from the statute." (Def. Br. 26-28). These arguments are 
unsupported and untenable. Defendants offer no legal or legislative authority to support 
these assertions and UREBA is devoid of any statement of such legislative intent. 
Moreover, the express rule making authority granted to the Commission pursuant to §61-
2-5.5(l)(a) belies Defendants' "implicit authority" argument. 
Defendants fail to acknowledge that the rule making authority of the Commission 
is limited by the provision that such rules may not be "inconsistent with this chapter." 
See, §61-2-5.5(l)(a), Addendum 6. Thus, the Commission was not free to ignore the 
legislature's deletion of the definition of "business opportunity" and its addition of the 
words "involving real property" to qualify the term "business opportunities" used in the 
definition of "real estate" in §61-2-2(14). in the 1985 amendments to UREBA. 
Accordingly, the Commission's contrary definition was not binding on the Utah Court of 
Appeals and is not binding on this Court. 
Defendants also argue that "an agency's interpretation of statutory language is 
entitled to deference" based on Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 588 
(Utah 1991), (Def. Br. 26-27) (Emphasis supplied) This argument is incorrect for at least 
three reasons. 
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First, there is no indication that the Commission's definition of "business 
opportunity" is an "interpretation of statutory language." (Emphasis supplied) This 
definition appears in rule 162-1-2.1.2 of the Utah Administrative Code which provides 
that, "Terms used in these rules are defined as follows:... ", indicating that the definitions 
set forth relate only to the rules of the Commission. These rules concern the licensing and 
regulation of real estate professionals. See, Utah Administrative Code, R 162, Real 
Estate, 162-1 through R. 162-109, Addendum 7. 
Second, the facts of this case are not akin to those in Morton. In Morton, the 
plaintiff alleged that the Tax Commission erred in its construction and application of a 
state statute in its findings of fact in a Tax Commission proceeding. The issue on appeal 
was whether the Court should defer to the Tax Commission's interpretation of the statute 
in the Tax Commission proceeding. Id. 557-558. (Emphasis supplied) Similarly, 
Williams v. Pub. Serv. Comm % 754 P.2d 41, 50 (Utah 1988) (Def. Br. 27), involved the 
Court's review of the Public Service Commission's interpretation of a statute in a 
proceeding before the Commission. Conversely, this case does not involve any 
proceeding before the Real Estate Commission. Thus, the issues concerning this Court's 
deference to Commission rulings presented in Morton and Williams are not present. 
Third, there is nothing to suggest that the Commission is in a better position than 
[than the Court] to construe the meaning of the phrase "business opportunity involving 
real property" in UREBA's definition of "real estate." See, Martinez v. Media-Paymaster 
Plus/ Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2007 UT 42,1J45, 164 P.3d 384. 
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Accordingly, Defendants' argument that Court of Appeals was required to defer to 
the Commission's definition of "business opportunity" is incorrect and should be 
rejected. 
G. Other States' Interpretations Of Their Real Estate Broker Acts Are Not 
Conclusive On The Interpretation Of UREBA Under Utah Law 
In determining that the UREBA phrase "business opportunity involving real 
property" does not encompass a sale of corporate stock where the corporation retains its 
real property assets, the Utah Court of Appeals held that Utah "join[s] those jurisdictions 
that recognize a distinction between the sale of assets and the sale of stock for purposes 
of applying statutes regulating the activities of real estate brokers. " Sachs, |^43 
In so holding, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that, "some jurisdictions have 
interpreted similar acts of their legislatures as including the sale of a business through a 
stock transfer" and that "in some instances, there are statutory differences that support a 
contrary approach." Sachs, at ffl|44-45 Based on this analysis, the Court of Appeals held 
that, "Regardless of which position boasts the higher number of decisions, for the reasons 
stated in this opinion, we conclude that the Utah Legislature did not intend UREBA to 
apply to the sale of corporate stock." Sachs, f^43 
Defendants argue that "a survey of case law and statutes from other jurisdictions 
confirms that the term 'business opportunities' includes the sale of an existing business 
through the transfer of its stock." (Def. Mem. 28-29). However, most of the decisions 
cited by Defendants do not contradict the Utah Court of Appeals' interpretation of 
UREBA because they either involve real property asset sales, which this case does not, or 
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because the real estate broker licensing statutes in those states contain explicit language 
requiring a real estate broker license for transactions for which no real estate broker 
license is required under UREBA.4 See also, Sachs, ffi[44-45. 
For example, Lieffv. Medco Prof I Sews. Corp., 973 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1998), (cited Def. Br. 29), involved the sale of 100% of the stock of a corporation 
for which the Colorado Court of Appeals held a brokers license was required. However, 
the Colorado statute requires a broker license for a broad range of transactions, including 
transactions involving a 
".. .business or business opportunity or the goodwill thereof or any 
interest therein when such act or transaction involves, directly or 
indirectly, any change in the ownership or interest in real estate, or in 
a leasehold interest or estate, or in a business or business opportunity 
which owns an interest in real estate." 
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §12-61-10 l(2)(i) (Emphasis supplied), See also, Sachs, at f44, n. 
21. 
4
 See, e.g. Shochet Secur., Inc. v. First Union Corp., 663 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D. Fla. 1987) 
(cited Def. Br. 28) (Stock sale under Florida act defining "broker" as .. .a person 
who.. .takes part in the procuring of... purchases of business enterprises or business 
opportunities...);Lieffv. MedcoProflServs. Corp., 973 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1998), (cited Def. Br. 29) (See discussion above, at 35); Broughall v. Black Forest Dev. 
Co., 593 P.2d 314, 316 (Colo. 1978), (cited Def. Br. 29) (Asset sale of radio station 
including leasehold interest under Colorado statute); Spring v. Rosauer, 641P.2d 1216, 
1219 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (cited Def. Br. 29) (Stock sale under Washington act 
defining "business opportunity" as including business, business opportunity and good 
will of an existing business or any one or combination thereof); Schmitt v. Coad, 604 
P.2d 507, 509 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (cited Def. Br. 29) (same statute as in Spring); 
Idaho statute defining "business opportunity" as including "established business, good 
will of an established business, or any interest therein, or any one (1) combination 
thereof."(Def. Br. 29, n.8) 
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However, UREBA lacks such broad and explicit definitions, and the term 
"business opportunities" in UREBA must be interpreted in light of its limiting phrase 
"involving real property" in §61-2-2(14). Sachs, ffi[38-39 
The remaining cases cited by Defendants involve decisions that turn on the courts' 
statutory construction of state real estate broker acts, based on an analysis of the 
particular legislative history and development of those state statutes.5 However, 
Defendants provide no legal authority compelling Utah courts to adopt the same 
interpretation of UREBA. (Def. Mem. 28-30) 
Defendants also fail to demonstrate any error in the Court of Appeals' analysis of 
the development of Utah law treating stock as personal property, the history of legislative 
reorganization that in 1983 split real estate licensing and enforcement from that of 
securities in Utah, the purposes and policies behind UREBA, and the well understood 
difference between corporate stock sales and asset sales under Utah law, that support the 
Court of Appeals' interpretation of UREBA as excluding the purchase of corporate stock. 
Sac/tf,^40-43, 45-51 
Although Defendants criticize the Court of Appeals' reliance on Gruber v. Owens-
Illinois Inc., 899 F.2d 1366 (3rd Cir. 1990), as "misplaced" because Pennsylvania's 
licensing act does not define "real estate" to include "business opportunities", (Def. Br. 
30), the Court of Appeals relied on Gruber for its reasoning that commercial transactions 
5 See, e.g., Cooney v. Ritter, 939 F.2d 81, 84-88 (3rd Cir. 1991) (cited Def. Mem. 28) 
(finding New Jersey statute applicable to sale of stock) and Everett v. Goodloe, 602 
S.E.2d 284, 289 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (cited Def. Mem. 29) (finding Georgia statute 
applicable to sale of corporate stock). 
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characterized by the purchase of shares in an existing corporation through stock 
acquisitions "would be distorted if the corporate form of sale were ignored, particularly 
when it is recognized that the title and ownership of whatever real estate may be involved 
in the sale remains within the corporate body, under the corporate name, and never 
changes hands." Sachs, [^43 The Court of Appeals correctly held that "this long 
recognized principle should not be ignored lightly, nor without clear direction from the 
Utah Legislature." Id. 
Although Defendants claim that "all but one of the cases cited by the Court of 
Appeals are similarly inapposite, because the statutes in the cited cases did not define 
"real estate" as including "business opportunities" (Def. Br. n. 9), this argument is 
incorrect. The Court of Appeals cited these cases as examples of states that preserve the 
distinction between corporate stock sales and asset sales, and consequently, do not 
interpret their real estate broker licensing acts as encompassing a corporate stock 
transaction where the corporation retains its real property assets in the transaction. Sachs, 
H43,n.l9 
H. The Court of Appeals Correctly Declined To Interpret UREBA As 
Encompassing Transactions Involving Exclusively The Sale Of Corporate 
Stock Where The Legislature Has Not Declared Its Intention To Do So 
Defendants criticize the Court of Appeals' interpretation of "business 
opportunities" as "restrictive" and purportedly leaving the term "without any effect or 
consequence." (Def. Mem. 31-32) However, the Court of Appeals correctly observed that 
the term "business opportunity" cannot be defined apart from its qualifying phrase 
"involving real property" in the definition of "real estate" under §61-2-2(14) of UREBA. 
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Sachs, Tf38 Thus, the issue here is was not whether the sale of UPCM's stock constituted 
a "business opportunity", but whether it constituted a "business opportunity involving 
real property" within the meaning of §61-2-2 (14). Sachs, ^ [40 
To the extent that the statutory phrase "business opportunity involving real 
property" may be interpreted differently based on other facts, the Court of Appeals was 
only required to interpret the phrase in light of the facts presented in this case. "The 
function of appellate courts, like that of courts generally, is not to give opinions on 
merely abstract or theoretical matters, but only to decide actual controversies injuriously 
affecting the rights of some party to the litigation." McRae v. Jackson, 526 P.2d 1190, 
1191 (Utah 1974). Defendants fail to demonstrate that the Court of Appeals' 
interpretation of UREBA is incorrect under the facts of this case. 
I. The Court Of Appeals Correctly Held That "Real Estate" In UREBA Does 
Not Encompass The Sale Of A Corporation's Stock Based On The Long 
Recognized Distinction Under Utah Law Between Stock Sales And Real 
Property Asset Sales 
Defendants do not dispute the Court of Appeals' conclusions that "the business 
opportunity at issue is the purchase of all of UPCM's capital stock," Sachs, 1flf4l* and that 
"corporate shares constitute a property interest quite distinct from the capital or tangible 
assets of the corporation." Sachs, ^42 Although Defendants argue that the Court of 
Appeals held that "a sale of securities can never be a sale of real estate" (Def. Br. 32), the 
Court of Appeals did not address this broad issue and made no such sweeping 
pronouncement. 
38 
While it may be, as Defendants assert, that "it is the legislature's prerogative to 
define the sale of stock in a corporation holding real property... as a business opportunity 
involving real estate and, therefore, a sale of real estate" (Def. Br. 33), the Utah Court of 
Appeals correctly declined Defendants' invitation to import a such a substantive 
definition into the phrase "business opportunities involving real property" in §61-2-2(14) 
of UREBA, where the Utah legislature has not unambiguously declared its intention to do 
so. Sachs, 1ffi36-42, 46-49 
Defendants alternatively argue that "the Court of Appeal's (sic) reliance on the 
form of the transaction rests on an anachronism" because "at the time Sachs found 
Jackson, no one -including Sachs - knew what form the transaction would ultimately 
take." (Def. Br. 33) This argument is also incorrect. Although Plaintiff Sachs did not 
know that the sale of UPCM would ultimately take the form of a merger because Sachs' 
involvement was limited to finding a buyer for UPCM, it is undisputed that Sachs never 
offered or agreed, nor did Lesser ever request Sachs, to find a buyer for any real property 
assets of UPCM. To the contrary, Lesser instructed Sachs that to find him someone who 
would buy UPCM outright. See, Plaintiffs Statement of Facts, f 11 at 8, Tfl4, at 9. Thus, 
Sachs, who was a shareholder in UPCM and knew that UPCM was a publicly held 
corporation, could reasonably infer that Capital's purchase of UPCM would involve the 
acquisition of 100% of UPCM's outstanding capital stock. Id., f 1, at 5. The fact that 
Sachs knew that the value of UPCM lay in its real property (Def. Br. 33), is also 
irrelevant, in light of the facts that Sachs never offered or agreed, and Lesser never 
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requested Sachs, to sell any real property assets of UPCM, Id., ffi[ 14-15, at 9-10, and that 
UPCM retained its real estate assets in the merger transaction. Id., ^23, at 12. 
Defendants also argue that a "person may become subject to UREBA, and its 
penalties, as a consequence of decisions of third parties made after that person has 
completed his services" (Def. Br. 34-35). Defendants failed to assert, brief or argue this 
claim in the district court or in the Court of Appeals. See, L&L: R. 1082-1083, 1124-
1129, 2068-2082; UPCM: R. 1206-1207, 1218-1223, 1986-1995; L&L Ct. App. Br. 19-
36; UPCM Ct. App. Br. 15-33. Thus, this Court should decline to consider it for the first 
time on certiorari. Tindley v. Salt Lake City School Dist., 2005 UT 30, f 10, 116 P.3d 295, 
298, quoting, Espinalv. Salt Lake City Bd ofEduc, 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990). 
Alternatively, and without waiving the foregoing argument, Defendants' argument 
is incorrect. Under the Court of Appeals" interpretation of UREBA, an individual seeking 
a finder's fee in relation to the purchase of a corporation's real property assets is 
protected from civil and criminal penalties under UREBA by obtaining a real estate 
broker's license. If the seller ultimately decides to sell the stock of the corporation rather 
than its real property assets, the individual will not suffer any penalty under UREBA 
because the Act does not apply to transactions for the sale of a corporation's stock where 
the corporation retains its real estate assets in the transaction. Sachs, f43 
Conversely, if a corporation agrees to pay an individual a finder's fee for finding a 
buyer for all of its stock and later decides the sell the corporation's real property assets, 
as opposed to its stock, the individual would have to have a real estate broker's license 
under UREBA to recover a finder's fee. However, the individual could not be penalized 
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under UREBA, because the individual never agreed to find a buyer for the real property 
assets of the corporation and had no intent to do so.6 Thus, the imposition of criminal 
penalties under UREBA is in no way contingent on any "after the fact discretionary 
action of a third party," as Defendants erroneously portray. 
J. The Court Of Appeals' Interpretation Of UREBA Is Consistent With 
Constitutional And Statutory Requirements Of Due Process And Equal 
Protection 
Defendants further argue that, "the Court of Appeals' interpretation of UREBA 
renders the statute constitutionally suspect" and "introduces significant equal protection 
and due process concerns whereas Defendants' interpretation avoids such problems." 
(Def. Br. 33-35). Again, Defendants never asserted, briefed or argued this claim in the 
district court or in the Court of Appeals. See, L&L: R. 1082-1083, 1124-1129, 2068-
2082; UPCM: R. 1206-1207, 1218-1223, 1986-1995; L&L Ct. App. Br. 19-36; UPCM 
Ct. App. Br. 15-33. Thus, the Court should decline to consider this claim. "With limited 
exceptions, the practice of this court has been to decline consideration of issues raised for 
the first time on appeal." Tindley v. Salt Lake City School Dist, 2005 UT 30, f^lO, n. 2, 
116 P.3d 295, 298, quoting Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. ofEduc., 797 P.2d 412, 413 
(Utah 1990). 
Alternatively, without waiving the foregoing argument, Defendants' argument is 
incorrect. The Court of Appeals' decision interpreting UREBA as excluding transactions 
6
 Section 76-2-101(l)(a) provides that: "A person is not guilty of an offense unless the 
person's conduct is prohibited by law; and (b)(i) the person acts intentionally, knowingly, 
recklessly, with criminal negligence, or with a mental state otherwise specified in the 
statute defining the offense, as the definition of the offense requires; or (ii) the person's 
acts constitute an offense involving strict liability." 
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exclusively involving corporate stock, confirms to the general public that UREB A does 
not apply to such transactions. Sachs, ffl[ 42-43 This interpretation is consistent with a 
common sense reading of §61-2-2(14) because a citizen looking at the statute would not 
commonly understand "a business opportunity involving real estate" to encompass the 
sale of a corporation's stock where the corporation retains its real property assets. 
The Court of Appeals also recognized that UREB A carries both civil and criminal 
•-I 
penalties for its violation, including fines and imprisonment. Sachs, ^[18-19 Thus, the 
Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the phrase "business opportunities involving real 
property" in §61-2-2(14) of UREB A, as excluding the sale of corporate stock where the 
corporation retains its real estate assets, to prevent the criminalization of innocent 
conduct not specifically prohibited by UREB A.8 This interpretation is consistent with 
the requirements for constitutional due process 9 and comports with decisions of Utah 
Pursuant to §68-3-4, civil and criminal penalties are not merged. This statute provides 
that "When the violation of a right admits of both a civil and criminal remedy, the right to 
prosecute the one is not merged in the other." 
Although Defendants argued in the Court of Appeals that UREB A is not a "penal" 
statute, Brief of Appellee Lesser and Loeb, at 24-26, Brief of Appellee UPCM, at 19-23, 
Defendants cite no Utah case to support this argument and Utah courts have traditionally 
considered criminal and civil statutes imposing substantial monetary and criminal 
penalties to be penal in nature. See, Arts Vision Institute, Inc. v. Wasatch Property 
Management, Inc., 2006 UT 45, till 0-12, 143 P.3d 278 (Utah Forcible Detainer statute); 
State of Utah v. Mooney, 2004 UT 49, ffii 17-19, 98 P.3d 420 (Utah Controlled Substances 
Act); IML. v. State of Utah, 2002 UT 110,1J21, 61 P.3d 1038 (Utah criminal libel 
statute), Shibata v. Bear River State Bank, 115 Utah 395, 205 P.2d 251, 254 (Utah 1949) 
(Utah statute providing double damages for wrongful failure to discharge or release 
mortgage). 
9
 Section 76-1-106 provides that, "All provisions of this code and offenses defined by 
the laws of this state shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms to 
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appellate courts interpreting statutes to avoid subjecting citizens to statutory civil and 
criminal penalties where statutes do not clearly prohibit their challenged conduct. See, 
e.g., State v. Gallegos, 2007 UT 81, ^16 (Adopting common sense interpretation of child 
endangerment statute to preclude criminalization of otherwise legal conduct); State v. 
Mooney, 2004 UT 49, If 17, 98 P.3d 420 ("Due process guarantees do not permit 
enforcement of a penal statute that forbids an act in terms so vague that persons of 
ordinary intelligence must necessarily guess at the statute's meaning and differ as to its 
application.") 
By contrast, Defendants' interpretation of the definition of "real estate" in UREBA 
does not abide with a common sense understanding of the statute, and does not afford 
citizens due process notice that "a business opportunity involving real property" includes 
transactions involving the sale of corporate stock. Thus, in Shochet Securities v. First 
Union Corporation, 663 F. Supp. 1035 (U.S.D.C. Fla. 1987), a federal district court held 
a Florida real estate broker licensing statute prohibiting payment of a commission to 
anyone who is not licensed under the statute, unconstitutional as applied to a securities 
broker who sought a fee on the sale of corporate stock. The court held that the title of the 
statute violated a provision of the Florida Constitution requiring that statutory titles give 
notice of subject of the statute, in that the title of the Florida real estate broker statute 
only referred to real property and real estate brokers. Id. at 1037-1038. 
promote justice and effect the objects of law and the general purposes of §76-1-104." In 
turn, Section 76-1-104(2) identifies one of the general purposes of the laws of the State of 
Utah as being "to define adequately the conduct and mental state which constitute each 
offense and safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal." 
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Likewise, in this case, Article VI, §22 of the Utah Constitution provides, in 
pertinent part, that "No bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall 
be clearly expressed in its title." The purpose of this constitutional requirement "is not a 
technical restriction on the legislature^ but its] practical purpose is to inform the 
legislature and the public what legislation is proposed, and [to insure] a title is sufficient 
that will lead to an inquiry into body of act..." State v. Kallas, 97 Utaih 492, 94 P.2d 414, 
418-419 (Utah 1939). As in Shochet, the bills and laws relating to UREBA have been 
consistently titled as relating to "real estate" and did not provide notice to the legislature 
or the citizens of Utah that UREBA was intended to cover transactions exclusively 
involving the sale of corporate stock.10 Thus, adopting Defendants' interpretation of 
UREBA as encompassing such transactions would present the same constitutional due 
process notice problem addressed in Shochet. 
Based upon the foregoing legal authorities, it is Defendants' interpretation of 
UREBA that raises constitutional due process problems, whereas the Plaintiff Sachs' 
interpretation poses no constitutional infirmity. Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 
838, 845 (Utah 1990) ("If alternative constructions of a statute are possible, we should 
adopt the one that leads to a minimum of constitutional conflict.") 
10
 See, e.g., H.B. No. 284, Laws of Utah 1985, Chapter 162 "Real Estate 
Amendments"; H.B. 102, Utah 1996 Session Laws, "Division of Real Estate-General 
Amendments"; S.B. 198, Utah 2003 Session Laws, "Division of Real Estate-Definitions 
Amendment; S.B. 172, Utah 2005 Session Laws, Chapter 199, "Division of Real Estate 
Amendments" Addendum 9. 
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K The Court of Appeals' Interpretation of UREBA Is Consistent With The 
Purposes and Policies of the Statute And Does Not Elevate Form Over 
Substance 
Contrary to Defendants' argument, the Court of Appeals' decision does not 
"elevate form over substance." (Def. Br. 35-36) The Court of Appeals specifically 
rejected this argument, stating that, "[w]e cannot agree that the sale of the stock of a 
corporation is legally equivalent to the sale of its assets. Nor do we believe that the 
distinction between the two elevates form over substance." Sachs, f 50 The Court of 
Appeals further observed that, "Utah has long recognized the importance of the separate 
legal identity of the corporation and has been unwilling to permit parties to ignore those 
distinctions." Sachs, ^51 (citing cases) 
As the Court of Appeals reasoned, "Capital chose to structure its acquisition of 
UPCM as a stock rather than an asset purchase... The difference in a buyer's assumption 
of liabilities when entering into a stock purchase agreement versus an asset purchase 
agreement is well known in the business community.... Defendants should not be 
permitted to enjoy the benefits of UPCM's separate corporate structure for some purposes 
while also claiming it elevates form over substance in an attempt to defeat Sachs' claim 
for a finder's fee." Sachs, ^ 51 
L. The Court of Appeals' Interpretation Of UREBA Is Consistent With the 
Purposes Of UREBA And Does Not Invite Abuse 
Defendants argue that the Court of Appeals' decision undermines the purposes of 
UREBA and "elevates form over substance" based on the theoretical possibility that an 
"an unscrupulous and unlicensed broker" might structure a transaction to avoid the 
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licensing requirements of UREBA. (Def. Br. 35-36) Defendants' hypothetical is wholly 
irrelevant to the facts of this case. Here, it is uncontested that Defendants themselves 
structured the transaction as the sale of UPCM's stock and Plaintiff Sachs played no role 
in the transaction. (Def. Br. 14) As the Court of Appeals aptly found, 
UREBA was adopted 'for the protection of members of the public 
who rely on licensed real estate brokers and salespeople to perform 
tasks that require a high degree of honesty and integrity.' 
Sachs, TJ49 Thus, the Court of Appeals' interpretation of UREBA as not encompassing an 
agreement to find a buyer for 100% of the stock of a publicly traded corporation "is 
consistent with the purpose of the Act because it is highly unlikely that unsophisticated 
members of the public will be party to a merger which results in one corporation 
purchasing 100% of the common stock of another." Id. -
The Court of Appeals also correctly reasoned that, "the purpose of UREBA "is not 
to protect real estate developers who seek relief from their own contractual obligations." 
Id., citing Global Recreation, Inc. v. Cedar Hills Dev. Co., 614 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 
1980). Sachs, ^49 In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Defendants were 
sophisticated real estate brokers and investors, represented by numerous attorneys and an 
investment banking firm. See, Statement of Facts, ffl[6, 25 at 7, 13. As such, Defendants 
are not within the class of residential buyers and sellers that the licensing requirements of 
UREBA were designed to protect. Accordingly, Defendants should not be permitted to 
assert Plaintiff Sachs' non-licensure under UREBA as a shield against Plaintiff Sachs' 
legitimate claim for a finder's fee, even if UREBA does apply to the subject transaction, 
which Plaintiff Sachs disputes. See, American Rural Cellular v. Systems Comm., 890 
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P.2d 1035, 1040-1041 (UtahApp. 1995) (Legislature's adoption of statutory bar to 
recovery does not preclude application of previous common law exception to the general 
rule of non-recovery where individuals asserting statutory bar are not within class of 
persons designed to be protected by licensing requirement.) 
Additionally, Defendants' argument that the sale of the stock of a corporation is 
equivalent to a sale of its assets (Def. Br. 34-35), cites no legal authority to counter the 
Court of Appeals' finding and conclusion that, "Utah has long recognized the separate 
legal identity of corporations and has been unwilling to permit parties to ignore those 
distinctions." Sachs, \5\ (citing cases) 
Finally, while criticizing the Court of Appeals for a purported lack of 
"jurisprudential pragmatism" (Def. Br. 36), Defendants fail to meet the Court of Appeals' 
pragmatic concern that "Defendants' position raises additional questions, including the 
amount of real property that must be owned by the subject corporation and the number of 
shares that must be transferred before the licensing requirements of UREBA would be 
triggered." Sachs, f51 As the Court of Appeals queried, "Would the sale of a single share 
of UPCM stock over the New York Stock Exchange require a Utah real estate license?" 
Id. The Court of Appeals' decision to construe UREBA in a manner that avoids this 
issue in the absence of any expressed legislative directive is correct and does not "elevate 
form over substance" as Defendants contend. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly held that UREBA 
does not preclude Plaintiff Sachs' claims against Defendants for breach of implied 
contract and this Court should affirm its decision. 
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POINT II THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD 
THAT THE UTAH STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT 
APPLY TO AN AGREEMENT TO FIND A BUYER FOR THE 
STOCK OF A CORPORATION IN EXCHANGE FOR A FEE 
A. The Plain Words Of The Utah Statute Of Frauds Do Not Require That An 
Agreement To Find A Buyer For The Stock Of A Corporation Must Be In 
Writing To Be Enforceable 
Section 25-5-4 of the Utah statute of frauds provides that "every agreement 
authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate for 
compensation" is "void unless the agreement, or some note or memorandum of the 
agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be charged with the agreement." Utah 
Code Ann. §25-5-4(1 )(e), Addendum 4. The Court of Appeals held that, "Even 
assuming, without deciding, that the Utah statute of frauds utilizes the same definition of 
"real estate" as UREBA, Sachs' alleged finder's fee agreement falls outside the reach of 
that statute for the same reasons that UREBA is inapplicable. Specifically, because stock 
in a corporation is personalty, not realty. §25-5-4 of Utah's statute of frauds does not 
apply to brokerage agreements for the sale of exclusively personal property." Sachs, f 52 
Defendants argue that this conclusion is incorrect and that §25-5-4 prohibits an 
oral agreement to find a buyer for the stock of a corporation for a fee, when read "in para 
materia" with the definition of "real estate" in §61-2-2(14) of UREBA. (Def Br. 36-38) 
However, this argument implicitly concedes that the plain language of §25-5-4(1 )(e) does 
not require such an agreement to be in writing to be enforceable. Moreover, the statute of 
frauds is not cross-referenced to UREBA and gives no indication that it is intended to be 
interpreted "in para materia" with UREBA. See, §25-5-4, Addendum 4. 
48 
The Court of Appeals also correctly determined that Defendants' "in para materia" 
argument is flawed, because neither UREBA nor the statute of frauds, separately or 
together, provides that a transaction involving exclusively the sale of corporate stock, 
constitutes "real estate", within the meaning of §25-5-4 of the Utah statute of frauds. 
Sachs, %52 
Finally, Defendants fail to counter the Court of Appeals' conclusion that excluding 
corporate stock transactions from the definition of "real estate" in UREB A, is consistent 
with §70A-8-l 12 (2001), which bars the application of the statute of frauds to contracts 
for the sale or purchase of securities n , and is also consistent with the Court of Appeals' 
decision in Mackintosh v. Hampshire, 832 P.2d 1298 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). In 
Mackintosh, the Court held that an oral agreement for services in exchange for a 10% 
interest in the profits of a partnership's real estate developments was not barred by the 
statute of frauds because the claim was not for an interest in real property per se and thus 
did not fall within the statute of frauds. Id. at 1302. Sachs, f 53 Based upon the foregoing 
legal authority, the Court of Appeals correctly held that, "Similarly, the purchase of the 
shares of UPCM gave Capital an interest in only the profits and losses of the corporation 
11
 Utah Code Ann. §70A-8-l 12 provides that: "A contract or modification of a contract 
for the sale or purchase of a security is enforceable whether or not there is a writing 
signed or authenticated by a party against whom enforcement is sought, even if the 
contract or modification is not capable of performance within one year of its making." 
See also, Uniform Commercial Code Comment to §70A-8-l 12 ("For securities 
transactions, whatever benefits a statute of frauds may play in filtering out fraudulent 
claims are outweighed by the obstacles it places in the development of modern 
commercial practices in the securities business.") 
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and did not represent any legal interest in its real property assets" such that the statute of 
frauds does not bar Plaintiff Sachs' claim to a finder's fee." Id. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that neither UREBA nor the Utah statute of 
frauds bars Plaintiff Sachs' implied contract claims against Defendants. Thus, Plaintiff 
Sachs respectfully requests the Court to affirm the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals 
and to remand the case to the district court for trial on the merits. 
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